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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HYDE T. CLAYTON,

Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE CI'TY, SALT
LAKE, COUNTY,
J. BRACKEN LEE, L. C.
ROMNEY, CONRAD
HARRISON, HERBERT F.
SMART, JOE L.
CHRISTENSEN, C. W.
BRADY, MARVIN JENSON,
and EDWIN Q. CANNON,
Respondents.

Case No. 9903

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The above en ti tied case is appealed to this
Court from a Judgment of the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The
case was filed in the Third District Court by a taxpayer against Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, and
the individual defendants as elected offici~als of Salt
Lake City and Salt Lake County.
1
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The action was initiated by the taxpayer to
enjoin or prohibit Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County
'and the elected officials from proceeding with a
contract alleged by the petitioner to be in excess of
or in abuse of their discretion.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
On April 8, 1963, the Honorable A. H. Ellett,
one of the judges of the Third District Court, after
hearing argument, granted a Motion on behalf of
all of the defendants for a Summary Judgment.
The judge's Order gr1anted the Motion and dismissed
the Petition with prejudice. It is from this Order
of the District Court that appeal is taken to the
Supreme Court of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The purpose of this appeal is to reverse the
Judgment awarded in the District Court granting
Summary Judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's Petition and sending this case back to the District Court
for a trial upon the issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The action initiat€d in the Third District Court
resulted from a proposed plan jointly by Salt Lake
City and Salt Lake County to build a new metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake City (R. 2).
For the purpose of effecting the construction of
a metropolitan Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City and
2
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Salt Lake County opevated jointly through their
officers and commissioners as a joint authority (R.
2) . In pursuance of the plan to build a metropolitan
Hall of Justice specifications for jail equipment
wPt'P published by and on behalf of the joint authority on or about October 30, 1962. (R. 2).
The cost of construction of the proposed metropolitan Hall of Justice was estimated by the joint
City and County authority to be in the approximate
sum of $800,000.00 (R. 2).
As a result of the publication of "specifications
for jail equipment" and an advertisement for bids,
bids were received. Among these bids was one received from Southern Steel Company and another
by Herrick Iron Works ( R. 3). Other bids were
received and all were opened on or about November
28, 1962. The bid of Herrick Iron Works was the
sum of $542,42'5.00 and the bid of Southern Steel
Company was in excess of 597,000.00. The bid of
Herrick Iron Works was more than $55,000.00 lower than the bid of Southern Steel. The bids of the
other companies participating were higher than
eithel'. (R. 3). On or about January 7, 1963,
the joint authority of Salt Lake City and Salt
Lake County accepted the bid of the Southern
Steel Company and rejected the lower bid of
Herrick Iron Works (R. 3).
The petitioner, a resident of Salt Lake City,
3
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Salt Lake County, brought the action which results
in this Appeal on behalf of himself and others simiLarly situated and on behalf of such other taxpayers
as might wish to join in the petition. (R. 2).
The petitioner requested the District Court to
make an Order requiring the individual defendants
to appear and show cause why they should not be
prohibited from proceeding in accordance with the
contract entered into by them acting for the joint
authority. The Petition further requested that they
be required to show cause why they should not be
prohibited from disbursing or dispensing public
funds in connection with said contract pending a
hearing 1and trial of the issues raised by the Petition
in their District Court. The Petition also requested
that upon a trial of the issues the Court make an
Order permanently prohibiting 1and restraining the
defendants and each of them from proceeding with
the contract into which they had entered with Southern Steel. (R. 5).
Based upon the verified Petition, the District
Court ordered the defendants' named to show cause
why they should not be prohibited during the pendency of the action from pursuing the contract into
which they had entered with the Southern Steel
Company.
When the matter came on for hearing, the
Court entered an Order enjoining the defendants
4
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from pursuing the con tract until the trial of the
action. It was further ordered that the petitioner
post a $1,000.00.
The trial court next considered the matter upon
the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and
entered the Order granting that Motion to dismiss
the Petition April 8, 1963. (R. 46).
STATEMENT OF POINT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MOTION OF THE DEFENDANTS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE RE'CORD BEFORE HIM
CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THERE WERE MANY
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT UNRESOLVED AND WHICH NECE8SITATED A TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING THE
MOTIDN OF THE DEFENDANTS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE RE·CORD BEFORE HIM
CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THERE WERE MANY
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT UNRESOLVED AND WHICH NECESSITATED A TRIAL.

Identical Motions for Summary Judgment were
filed on behalf of Salt Lake City and the Salt Lake
City Commissioners and on behalf of Salt Lake
County and the Salt Lake County Commissioners.
(R. 24-27). These Motions were based upon Affidavits filed on behalf of the moving parties of Roy
W. McLeese, Salt Lake City Engineer, and Harold
5
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K. Beecher, the archi teet for the public safety and
jail building. These Affidavits are found in the
Record - Mr. McLeese's, R. 16-2'3, inclusive, and
Mr. Beecher, R. 7-14, inclusive.
'These MfidJavits were traversed by an Affidavit made by Conrad R. Mader, Security Equipment Sales Engineer for the Herrick Iron Works.
His affidavit is found in the Record, R-38-44, inclusive. It is scarcely necessary to refer to the provisions of Rule 56 (c) relating to the basis upon
which summary judgment may be granted.
The important portions of the rule upon which
these motions were based reads as follows:
'~The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, give herewith the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact, and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law."

Decisions construing this portion of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and the comparable Federal
Rule are legion. The general tenor of these decisions is that summary judgment is a harsh and
stringent remedy and is not to be granted unless
it clearly 1appears that there are no genuine issues
of material fact which require resolution and that
the rna tter can be disposed of simply as a question
of law.
6
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Conversely stated, if from the records and
documents before the Court, it appears that there
are gneuine issues of fact that require trial, summary judgment is not a proper remedy.
A representative statement of the principle for
which the appellant contends and upon which the
appellant relies is found in the opinion of Judge
Hutcheson of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in lrhitaker vs. Coleroon, 115 F. 2d 305:
" ... The invoked procedure, valuable as it is
for striking through sham claims and defenses which stand in the way of a direct approach to the truth of a case, was not intended to, it cannot deprive a litigant of, or at
all encroach upon, his right to a jury trial.
" ... To proceed to summary judgment it is
not sufficient then that the judge may not
credit testimony proffered or a tendered issue. It must appear that there is no substantial evidence on it, that is, either that the
tendered evidence is in its nature too incredible to b eaccepted by reasonable minds, or
that conceding its truth, it is without legal
probative force . . .
" ... Summary judgment procedure is not a
catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants into its toils ~and deprive them of a trial,
it is a liberal measure, liberally designed for
arriving at the truth. Its purpose is not to cut
litigants off from their right of trial by jury
if they really have evidence which they will
offer on a trial, it is to carefully test this
out, in advance of tri al by inquiring and determining whether such evidence exists."
1

7
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A further annunciation of the principle that
the appellant believes applicable is found in the
opinion of Judge Riddick speaking for the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Walling vs. Fair_mont
Cremery Comp1any, 139 F. 2d 3'18:
On a motion for a summary judgment the
burden of establishing the nonexistence of
any genuine issue of fact is upon the moving
party, all doubts are resolved against him,
and his supporting affidavidts ~and depositions, if any, are carefully scrutinized by the
court ... On appeal from an order granting
a defendant's motion for summary judgment
the circuit court of appeals must give the
plaintiff the benefit of every doubt."
Another statement of the principle particularly
applicable to the situation presented by this appeal
is found in Sprague vs. Vogt, 150 F. 2d 79'5, 801, in
which Judge Woodrough of the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals says the following:
"That one reasonably may surmise that the
plain tiff is unlikely to prevail upon a tri,al, is
not a sufficient basis for refusing him his
day in court with respect to issues which are
not shown to be sham, frivolous, or so unsubstantial that it would obviously be futile to
try them."
Upon many occasions this Court has announced
the same views 1as those expressed by the various
Federal Circuits in construing and applying the
comparable positions of the Federal Rules. Representative among these case is In Re Willinms Estate,
8
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348 P. 2d 683. This was an action by the petitioner,
Gladys Wil!ilams, against the administrator of the
Estate of the decedent to be included as an heir at
law. The petitioners contention was based upon a
claimed agreement by the decedent and the plaintiff's natural mother to 1adopt her. No Decree of
Adoption was ever secured and the question was
whether the purported agreement to adopt should
be effective to permit the petitioner to participate
as an heir at law.
The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment against the petitioner and in favor
of the administrator of the estate. It was reviewed
by this Court and its decision reversed the trial
court upon the theory that if the proof which the
plaintiff could produce in the light most favorable to her could justify a finding of an agreement
to adopt, then she should have an opportunity to
present the proof and summ1ary judgment was an
improper remedy.
Similarly in Brandt vs. Springville Banking
Company, 353 P. 2d 460, 10 Utah 2d 350, this court
said the following:
vVe are cognizant of the desireability of permitting litigants to fully present their case
to the court and summary judgment prevents
this. For that reason courts are, and should be,
reluctant to invoke this remedy.''
In Bullock vs. Deseret Dodge and Truck Center,
9
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356 P. 2d 559, this Court expressed the principle
involved as follows:
"A summary judgment must be supported by
evidence, admissions and inferences which
when viewed in the light most favorable to
the loser shows that there is no genuine issue
as to ~any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Such showing must preclude all reasonable possibility that the looser could, if given
a trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor."
Tanner vs. Utah Poultry and Farmers Cooperative, 359 P. 2d 18, was an action against the Cooperative for the proceeds of marketing trukey
crops. A defense was asserted on the basis of a
purported release of any claim by the plaintiff
against the Cooperative. A Motion for Summary
Judgment in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiff was granted and the trial judge was reversed by this Court. The case held that an issue
of fact arose as a result of the pleadings and the
contentions of the parties which necessitated a trial.
The Court said, among other things:
"A summary judgment is appropri!ate only
where the favored party makes a showing
which precludes as a matter of law the awarding of any relief to the losing party."
The problem presented by this appeal, as in
most appeals, is not a delieniation of the principle
which is controlling, but the application of the prin10
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ciple or principles to the facts presented by the record which is before the Court.
As previously stated, the Motions of the defendants were based upon the affidavits of Roy W.
McLeese and Harold K. Beecher. These were tvaversed in detail by an affidavit filed 'by Mr. Conrad
Mader on behalf of the petitioner.
It is the position of the appellant that these
affidavits clearly point out differences of opinion
as to factual matters which are material to the determination of the lawsuit.
The following portion of the argument is a
reference paragraph by paragraph to these affidavits demonstrating the factual issues which remained unresolved when the matter was argued before the trial court and which the appellant feels
necessitated a trial.
The affidavit of Mr. Beecher and Mr. McLeese
are identical therefore, the affidavit of Mr. Mader
in contr-avention will be compared with that of Mr.
Beecher.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Beecher's affidavit (R.
8) say in effect that the specifications called for
both electrical and mechanical remote fully selective movement control. These pavagraphs say that.
the bid of HeiTick Iron Works was a permitted
alternate but did not comply with the specifications.
11
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Paragraph 3 of Mader's affidavit states that the
Herrick Iron Works did comply with the specifications 1and included an additional amount of
$4,150.00 for the furnishing of emergency power.
Paragraph 12 of Beecher's affidavit states in
effect that the system proposed by the Herrick Company could be bid only as an alternate. (R. 9).
Paragraph 7 of Mader's affidavit (R. 40)
states that the full automatic selective system proposed by Herrick was acceptable pursuant to Paragraph 24-A of the specifications and was not an
alternate proposal.
Paragraph 17 of Beecher's affidavit says that
Drawing 71-A of the Herrick plans does not provide the type of construction specified (R. 10).
Paragraph 8 of Mader's affidavit (R. 40) says
that 71-A clearly shows the type of door construction
and is in conformance with Section 23 of the instructions to jail equipment bidders.
Pargarphs 20 and 2'1 of Beecher's affidavit (R.
11) claim that the Herrick bid did not set up the
length of horizon tal cover boxes.
Paragrtaph 10 of Mader's affidavit (R. 41)
says that the Herrick bid sets out the specifications,
the approximate width of cells from six feet to
twenty-four feet and that the model was demonstrated with the covering boxes proposed.
12
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Beecher's affidavit says in substance in Baragraphs 22 and 23 (R. 11-12) that the Herrick bid
sets up a conflict and produces ambiguity as to the
power requirement for the operation of independent
sliding doors.
Mader's affidavit in Paragraph 11 (R. 41)
states that this specification submitted by the Herrick Iron Company clearly shows the power source
for independent sliding doors.
Beecher's affidavit in Paragraph 25 (R. 12)
says that the d~awing submitted 'by the Herrick
Iron Works as it relates to "Sally Port Doors" does
not conform to specifications.
Paragraph 12 of Mader's affidavit says in effect that the dvawing submitted the Herrick Iron
'Vorks does conform to the requirements of the
specifications. (R. 41)
Paragraph 26 of Beecher's affidavit ( R. 1213) says in effect that Drawing 71-A by Herrick
does not provide the thickness, sizes and type of
material for door jamb components.
Baragraph 13 of Mader's affivadit (R. 42)
says the Drawing 71-A by Herrick Iron Works
clearly shows the thickness, sizes and types of the
door jam components.
Paragraph 27 of Beecher's affidavit (R. 13)
states that Paragrnph 23 of the Instructions to Bid13
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ders require submission in duplicate of substitute
specifications.
Paragraph 14 of Mader's affidavit (R. 42)
states that the Iron Works did furnish the necessary
alternate specifications and drawings in duplicate.
Paragraphs 29 and 30 of Beecher's affidavit
( R. 13) state that aluminum cover, instead of steel,
was provided on the model submitted by Herrick
Iron Works, and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirement based upon the specifications.
Paragraph 15 of Mader's affidavit (R. 4'2-43)
says that the model conformed to the specifications
and that the aluminum cover was pointed out to
those persons who examined it and that no objection was made and that no rejection of the bid was
contemplated upon that basis.
Paragraphs 31 1and 32 of Beecher's affidavit
(R. 1'3-14) say that there was an ambiguity of
quality of materials to be installed in the final Herrick Iron Company product.
Paragraph 17 of Mader's affidavit (R. 4'3-44)
says that there was no ambiguity in the material
proposed to be submitted by the Herrick Iron Works
and that the model was the same as that proposed
to be supplied by the Herrick Iron Works.
Paragraph 34 of Beecher's affidavit (R. 14)
says that the instructions to jail equipment bidders
did not permit any erasures or modifications. This
14
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presumably implied the proposal of Herrick Iron
Works did have erasures or modifications.
Paragraph 18 of Mader's affidavit (R. 44)
states that the proposal of the Herrick Iron Works
did not contain 1any erasers nor did the proposal require any modification subsequent to the opening of
bids to "clearly describe the substitute functions
and equipment".
What has been presented is a summary or a
resume of these matters contained in these conflicting affidavits which in view of the 1appellant clearly
shows in the evidence which would be presented at a
trial disagreement relating to material matters of
fact.
An application of the principal regarding propriety of granting summary judgment based upon
the record before this court demonstrates that the
judgment of the trial court based upon the motions
was improperly gran ted; and should require a tri1al
upon the issues.
Oral argument in the submissions for summary judgment was extensive. It is unfortunate that
a complete stenographic record of the statements
of counsel and the colloquy between court 1and counsel is not available.
At the request of the appellant, the reporter
was present during a portion of the argument for
the purpose of making a specific record relating to
15
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the disposition of the motions for summary judg.
ment on the basis of the written record before the
court l"ather than the statements of counsel. In this
connection the court's attention is invited to the
stenographic record made during a part of the argument (R. 149-152). It appeared to the writer that
the court, during the progress of the argument, became concerned with some matters which the writer
believed to be evidentuary rather than directly related to those documents which were properly before the court. Although there is but a fragmentary
record of a proceeding had upon argument, counsel
for the appellant makes the following representations to this Court with respect to that 1argument
and the comments of the trial judge.
During the argument, the learned trial judge
seemed to be concerned with respect to the utility
and quality of one inch steel bars as distinguished
from 7/8th inch steel bars. The specifications and
the bids submitted indicate, 'and the record is before this Court, that Southern Steel Company intended to employ one inch steel bars and Herrick
Iron Works 7/8th inch steel bars.
As the trial judge evidenced some concern with
respect to this difference and indicated that this
might have some bearing on his ruling on the Motions then before him, his attention was invited to
testimony of one of the members of the joint 1author16
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ity, C. W. Brady, which appeared in his deposition.
Thi~ deposition is designated as a portion of the
rrcord on appeal. The following portion of his depo~ition, under cross-examination by Mr. Crellin, representing Salt Lake City, is set forth verbatum
(R. 137-138) :

"Q. Do you believe that the one inch steel
proposed by Southern Steel in their bidlactually involves a superior type of equipment to
the seven eighths type steel proposed by Herrick Iron Works? Doesn't this in fact provide a more substantial system?
"A. No, in my belief it does not. There you
have it right there. (witness indicates) That
is how interested I was. This is a piece of one
inch. This is a piece of seven eighths. Now if
you can see any great deal of difference in
that piece of steel at the bottom and the piece
of steel at the top. My main interest on this
was the fact that the seven eighths piece of
steel passed identically the same test as the
one inch test 1and I maintained that we should
go not on the size of the bar but the fact of
what that bar would withstand. Now if this
is true, then they could bid a piece of inch
and a half if this would be any stronger but
that seven eighths piece of steel would stand
the same test as the one inch. As a matter of
fact I think the seven eighths gives you greater visibility between them bars. I don't think
this piece of steel (witness indicates) offers
one bit more protection than this steel right
there.
"Q. does it cost more?
"A. The one inch, yes, because you are pay17
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ing for weight and it is bound to cost you
more.
"Q. And the system is actually going to cost
more, isn't it, one inch steel in this jail flacility is going to cost considerably more because
of that one inch steel regardless of anything
else?
"A. That is one of my arguments. Why
should we be paying more for weight when
we don't need it, that is one of my arguments."
Shortly before the trial judge announced his
decision for summary judgment, he made a statement in substance and effect as follows:
"Jesus Christ in all His glory could never
convince me that 7/8ths inch steel bars are
as good as one inch steel bars."
The writer is sure that even counsel for the respondents will recall this statement.
Since no findings of fact or conclusions of law
were prepared, and were not required to be made
by the trial judge in granting the Motions, it is
difficult to determine from the record we have,
upon what basis he made his decision to grant the
Motions for Summary Judgment.
It is, however, the view of the appellant that
the record clearly indicates disputed matters of
fact, which require trial and that there is at least
a possibility that some matters which would be the
18
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subject of the submission of evidence upon the trial
of the matter were taken in to account by the trial
judge in making his ruling on these Motions.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted, that, for the reasons asserted above the ruling of the trial judge in
granting the Motions of the defendants 1and respondents for Summary Judgment and dismissing the
plaintiff's petition should be reversed and that this
case should be remanded to the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for ~a
trial upon its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.
Attorney for Appellant
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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